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Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-Feld | Wert | Sprache |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Koethenbuerger, Marko | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2006-09-06 | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2009-07-28T08:12:17Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2009-07-28T08:12:17Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2006 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/25799 | - |
dc.description.abstract | This paper analyzes whether changes in the timing of equalizing transfers to state governments necessitate an adjustment in federal corrective policy. According to the existing literature (assuming an ex-ante choice of transfers), the corrective grant is equal to the marginal damage/benefit inflicted by externality generation. When the federal government accommodates state finances ex-post, the grant differs in formula from existing prescription. Allocative federal policy corrects state policy incentives twofold. It entails a correction for the distortion in the marginal benefit of state spending (as in earlier literature) and for the distortion in the marginal cost of public funds induced by the ex-post provision of transfers. The required grant rule is generically disproportionate to the equilibrium externality (even with lump-sum taxation). Furthermore, the ex-post provision of transfers is critical for the nature of the equilibrium inefficiency. Equalizing transfers at least partly internalize consumption spill-overs, but simultaneously establishes a new source of inefficiency. As a final result, the existing prescription for allocative federal policy continues to apply if the public good is pure. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunich | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aCESifo Working Paper |x1754 | en |
dc.subject.jel | H7 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D62 | en |
dc.subject.jel | H3 | en |
dc.subject.jel | H1 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.title | Ex-post redistribution in a federation: implications for corrective policy | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 517015234 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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