Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/25794 
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dc.contributor.authorHolzner, Christianen
dc.contributor.authorMeier, Volkeren
dc.contributor.authorWerding, Martinen
dc.date.accessioned2006-09-05-
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-28T08:12:13Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-28T08:12:13Z-
dc.date.issued2006-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/25794-
dc.description.abstractThe impact of a stronger work requirement for welfare recipients in a workfare program is studied in an efficiency wage model where a representative firm chooses its level of monitoring activities. A stricter workfare policy raises employment and monitoring activities. It typically increases profits and reduces the tax rate. The impact on the net wage is ambiguous. Utility levels of employed workers and welfare recipients may increase even if the net wage declines. The utility differential between these two groups of workers shrinks.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x1749en
dc.subject.jelH53en
dc.subject.jelJ41en
dc.subject.jelJ60en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.titleWorkfare, monitoring, and efficiency wages-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn517005778en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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