Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/25794
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dc.contributor.authorHolzner, Christianen_US
dc.contributor.authorMeier, Volkeren_US
dc.contributor.authorWerding, Martinen_US
dc.date.accessioned2006-09-05en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-28T08:12:13Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-28T08:12:13Z-
dc.date.issued2006en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/25794-
dc.description.abstractThe impact of a stronger work requirement for welfare recipients in a workfare program is studied in an efficiency wage model where a representative firm chooses its level of monitoring activities. A stricter workfare policy raises employment and monitoring activities. It typically increases profits and reduces the tax rate. The impact on the net wage is ambiguous. Utility levels of employed workers and welfare recipients may increase even if the net wage declines. The utility differential between these two groups of workers shrinks.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo working paper|x1749en_US
dc.subject.jelH53en_US
dc.subject.jelJ41en_US
dc.subject.jelJ60en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.titleWorkfare, monitoring, and efficiency wagesen_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn517005778en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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