Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/25778 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2006
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 1733
Verlag: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Zusammenfassung: 
The paper studies the impact of government budget constraint in a pure adverse selection problem of monopoly regulation. The government maximizes total surplus but incurs some cost of public funds. An alternative to regulation is proposed in which firms are free to enter the market and to choose their price and output levels. However the government can contract ex-post with the private firms. This ex-post contracting set-up allows more flexibility than traditional regulation where government commits to both investment and operation cashflows. This is especially relevant in case of high technological uncertainties.
JEL: 
L43
L51
D82
L33
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
Erscheint in der Sammlung:

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
2.47 MB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.