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Autoren: 
Dreher, Axel
Sturm, Jan-Egbert
Datum: 
2006
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 1724
Zusammenfassung: 
Using panel data for 188 countries over the period 1970-2002 this paper empirically analyzes the influence of the IMF and the World Bank on voting patterns in the UN General Assembly. Countries receiving adjustment programs and larger non-concessional loans from the World Bank vote more frequently in line with the average G7 country. The same is true for countries obtaining non-concessional IMF programs. Regarding voting coincidence with the US, World Bank (concessional and non-concessional) loans have a significant impact, while the IMF has not. These results are robust to the inclusion of control variables and method of estimation.
JEL: 
F33
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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