Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/257527 
Year of Publication: 
2021
Citation: 
[Journal:] Games [ISSN:] 2073-4336 [Volume:] 12 [Issue:] 2 [Article No.:] 45 [Publisher:] MDPI [Place:] Basel [Year:] 2021 [Pages:] 1-13
Publisher: 
MDPI, Basel
Abstract: 
This work aims to provide different perspectives on the relationships between cooperative game theory and the research field concerning climate change dynamics. New results are obtained in the framework of competitive bargaining solutions and related issues, moving from a cooperative approach to a competitive one. Furthermore, the dynamics of balanced and super-balanced games are exposed, with particular reference to coalitions. Some open problems are presented to aid future research in this area.
Subjects: 
balanced and super-balanced games
climate change
competitive bargaining sets
non-empty core
sustainability
JEL: 
C70
C78
C60
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article
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