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[Journal:] Games [ISSN:] 2073-4336 [Volume:] 12 [Issue:] 1 [Article No.:] 20 [Publisher:] MDPI [Place:] Basel [Year:] 2021 [Pages:] 1-16
MDPI, Basel
We present a tractable generalization of quantal response equilibrium via non-expected utility preferences. In particular, we introduce concave perturbed utility games in which an individual has strategy-specific utility indices that depend on the outcome of the game and an additively separable preference to randomize. The preference to randomize can be viewed as a reduced form of limited attention. Using concave perturbed utility games, we show how to enrich models based on logit best response that are common from quantal response equilibrium. First, the desire to randomize can depend on opponents' strategies. Second, we show how to derive a nested logit best response function. Lastly, we present tractable quadratic perturbed utility games that allow complementarity.
limited attention
non-expected utility
quantal response equilibrium
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