Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/25747
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dc.contributor.authorSchindler, Dirken_US
dc.contributor.authorSchjelderup, Guttormen_US
dc.date.accessioned2006-09-04en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-28T08:11:38Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-28T08:11:38Z-
dc.date.issued2006en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/25747-
dc.description.abstractWe study how harmonization of corporate tax systems affects the stability of international cartels. We show that tax base harmonization reinforces collusive agreements, while harmonization of corporate tax rates may destabilize or stabilize cartels. We also find that bilateral and full harmonization to a common standard is worse from society's point of view than unilateral harmonization to a minimum tax standard.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo working paper|x1702en_US
dc.subject.jelH87en_US
dc.subject.jelL1en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.stwUnternehmensbesteuerungen_US
dc.subject.stwSteuerbemessungen_US
dc.subject.stwSteuerharmonisierungen_US
dc.subject.stwMultinationales Unternehmenen_US
dc.subject.stwSteuerwirkungen_US
dc.subject.stwKartellen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleCompany tax reform in Europe and its effect on collusive behavioren_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn516950932en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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