Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/257444 
Year of Publication: 
2020
Citation: 
[Journal:] Games [ISSN:] 2073-4336 [Volume:] 11 [Issue:] 3 [Article No.:] 26 [Publisher:] MDPI [Place:] Basel [Year:] 2020 [Pages:] 1-9
Publisher: 
MDPI, Basel
Abstract: 
In this note I show that the equilibrium in cutoff strategies observed in auctions with a buy-it-now price may also arise in markets where objects are sold simultaneously by auctions and posted prices. However, contrary to auctions with a buy-it-now price where buyers need to know only the total number of players in the market, in the latter environment buyers must also observe the number of active bidders in the auction for the equilibrium to exist in cutoff strategies.
Subjects: 
auctions
competing mechanism
price posting
JEL: 
C70
D44
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article
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