Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/25739 
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dc.contributor.authorGüth, Werneren
dc.date.accessioned2008-07-30-
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-27T09:40:50Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-27T09:40:50Z-
dc.date.issued2008-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/25739-
dc.description.abstractSimilar to welfare economics where with(out) interpersonal comparisons one defines unique (set-valued) welfare (Pareto) optima, we present a framework for one-person decision making where with(out) a prior probability distribution individual optimality prescribes usually a unique (set of) choice(s). Satisfiable aspirations in the sense that there exists some choice guaranteeing them define a much larger choice set whose intersection with the set of prior-free optimal choices is never empty. We also review experimental procedures and results which incentivize aspiration formation and reject even prior-free optimality experimentally.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aFriedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics |cJenaen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aJena Economic Research Papers |x2008,055en
dc.subject.jelB4en
dc.subject.jelD81en
dc.subject.jelD10en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordSatisficingen
dc.subject.keywordbounded rationalityen
dc.subject.keywordoptimalityen
dc.subject.stwBeschränkte Rationalitäten
dc.subject.stwEntscheidungen
dc.subject.stwTesten
dc.titlePrior-free optimality and satisficing: a common framework and its experimental implementation-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn572968353en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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