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Autoren: 
Güth, Werner
Datum: 
2008
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Jena Economic Research Papers No. 2008,055
Zusammenfassung: 
Similar to welfare economics where with(out) interpersonal comparisons one defines unique (set-valued) welfare (Pareto) optima, we present a framework for one-person decision making where with(out) a prior probability distribution individual optimality prescribes usually a unique (set of) choice(s). Satisfiable aspirations in the sense that there exists some choice guaranteeing them define a much larger choice set whose intersection with the set of prior-free optimal choices is never empty. We also review experimental procedures and results which incentivize aspiration formation and reject even prior-free optimality experimentally.
Schlagwörter: 
Satisficing
bounded rationality
optimality
JEL: 
B4
D81
D10
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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