Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/25737
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dc.contributor.authorUske, Tobiasen_US
dc.date.accessioned2008-07-30en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-27T09:40:49Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-27T09:40:49Z-
dc.date.issued2008en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/25737-
dc.description.abstractAs firms implement tournament bonus reward schemes, mainly the idea is to introduce competition amongst their agents in the order to promote their performance. Tournaments in which agents compete for a bonus by investing effort, are frequently applied, e.g., in development races, political contests, and promotion tournaments. The fallibility of evaluation processes and the inherent variability of competitors' effort choices introduce uncertainty to tournament settings with respect to the outcome. If heterogeneous agents interact in such a setting, experimental results suggest that increasing uncertainty leads to more excess of effort if compared to optimality (Avrahami et al., 2007). This paper experimentally investigates whether the observed overperformance in the tournament is similar to overbidding in auctions. Furthermore, it disentangles two possible sources of over-performance: either biased responses to, or wrong beliefs of, opponents' effort choices. We show that over-performance can be explained by tournament fever: agents overreact to own beliefs, if compared to best responses, and mainly overestimate their opponents. Leveling uncertainty influences both overshooting and the precision of beliefs.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aUniversität Jena und Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik|cJenaen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aJena economic research papers|x2008,057en_US
dc.subject.jelJ33en_US
dc.subject.jelM42en_US
dc.subject.jelM52en_US
dc.subject.jelM55en_US
dc.subject.keywordUncertaintyen_US
dc.subject.keywordincentive effectsen_US
dc.subject.keywordtournament feveren_US
dc.subject.keywordauction feveren_US
dc.subject.keywordall-pay auctionen_US
dc.subject.stwLeistungsorientierte Vergütungen_US
dc.subject.stwRisikoen_US
dc.subject.stwLeistungsanreizen_US
dc.subject.stwStressen_US
dc.subject.stwAuktionstheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwTesten_US
dc.titleTournament fever and the perception of strategic uncertainty in performance contestsen_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn572965400en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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