Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/25737 
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dc.contributor.authorUske, Tobiasen
dc.date.accessioned2008-07-30-
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-27T09:40:49Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-27T09:40:49Z-
dc.date.issued2008-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/25737-
dc.description.abstractAs firms implement tournament bonus reward schemes, mainly the idea is to introduce competition amongst their agents in the order to promote their performance. Tournaments in which agents compete for a bonus by investing effort, are frequently applied, e.g., in development races, political contests, and promotion tournaments. The fallibility of evaluation processes and the inherent variability of competitors' effort choices introduce uncertainty to tournament settings with respect to the outcome. If heterogeneous agents interact in such a setting, experimental results suggest that increasing uncertainty leads to more excess of effort if compared to optimality (Avrahami et al., 2007). This paper experimentally investigates whether the observed overperformance in the tournament is similar to overbidding in auctions. Furthermore, it disentangles two possible sources of over-performance: either biased responses to, or wrong beliefs of, opponents' effort choices. We show that over-performance can be explained by tournament fever: agents overreact to own beliefs, if compared to best responses, and mainly overestimate their opponents. Leveling uncertainty influences both overshooting and the precision of beliefs.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aFriedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics |cJenaen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aJena Economic Research Papers |x2008,057en
dc.subject.jelJ33en
dc.subject.jelM42en
dc.subject.jelM52en
dc.subject.jelM55en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordUncertaintyen
dc.subject.keywordincentive effectsen
dc.subject.keywordtournament feveren
dc.subject.keywordauction feveren
dc.subject.keywordall-pay auctionen
dc.subject.stwLeistungsorientierte Vergütungen
dc.subject.stwRisikoen
dc.subject.stwLeistungsanreizen
dc.subject.stwStressen
dc.subject.stwAuktionstheorieen
dc.subject.stwTesten
dc.titleTournament fever and the perception of strategic uncertainty in performance contests-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn572965400en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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