Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/25707
Authors: 
Hoerisch, Hannah
Kirchkamp, Oliver
Year of Publication: 
2007
Series/Report no.: 
Jena economic research papers 2008,023
Abstract: 
We use experiments to compare dynamic and static wars of attrition (i.e. second-price all-pay auctions) and first-price all-pay auctions. Many other studies find overbidding in first-price all-pay auctions. We can replicate this property. In wars of attrition, however, we find systematic underbidding. We study bids and revenue in different experimental frames and matching procedures and draw a link to the literature on stepwise linear bidding functions.
Subjects: 
War of attrition
dynamic bidding
all-pay auction
stabilisation
volunteer’s dilemma
experiment
JEL: 
C72
C92
D44
E62
H30
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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