Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/25685 
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dc.contributor.authorFischer, Svenen
dc.contributor.authorGüth, Werneren
dc.contributor.authorKöhler, Christophen
dc.date.accessioned2008-03-13-
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-27T09:40:09Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-27T09:40:09Z-
dc.date.issued2008-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/25685-
dc.description.abstractWe experimentally test how acceptance thresholds react to the decision of the proposer in a three party ultimatum game to exclude one of two responders with veto power from the game. We elicit responder acceptance thresholds in case the proposer decides to exclude one of them, what increases the available pie, and in case he doesn’t exclude him despite strong monetary incentives. We find that on the aggregate level the proposer’s decision has no effect on acceptance thresholds. However, if the proposer excludes one responder, the distribution of thresholds becomes bimodal, indicating a polarization in behavior.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aFriedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics |cJenaen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aJena Economic Research Papers |x2008,011en
dc.subject.jelC91en
dc.subject.jelJ52en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordbargainingen
dc.subject.keywordexperimenten
dc.subject.keywordlabor marketsen
dc.subject.stwPersonalabbauen
dc.subject.stwRentabilitäten
dc.subject.stwLohnverhandlungenen
dc.subject.stwVerhandlungstheorieen
dc.subject.stwGerechtigkeiten
dc.subject.stwEmotionen
dc.subject.stwTesten
dc.titleEffects of profitable downsizing on collective bargaining-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn559800916en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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