Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/25685
Full metadata record
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorFischer, Svenen_US
dc.contributor.authorGüth, Werneren_US
dc.contributor.authorKöhler, Christophen_US
dc.date.accessioned2008-03-13en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-27T09:40:09Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-27T09:40:09Z-
dc.date.issued2008en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/25685-
dc.description.abstractWe experimentally test how acceptance thresholds react to the decision of the proposer in a three party ultimatum game to exclude one of two responders with veto power from the game. We elicit responder acceptance thresholds in case the proposer decides to exclude one of them, what increases the available pie, and in case he doesn’t exclude him despite strong monetary incentives. We find that on the aggregate level the proposer’s decision has no effect on acceptance thresholds. However, if the proposer excludes one responder, the distribution of thresholds becomes bimodal, indicating a polarization in behavior.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aUniversität Jena und Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik|cJenaen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aJena economic research papers|x2008,011en_US
dc.subject.jelC91en_US
dc.subject.jelJ52en_US
dc.subject.keywordbargainingen_US
dc.subject.keywordexperimenten_US
dc.subject.keywordlabor marketsen_US
dc.subject.stwPersonalabbauen_US
dc.subject.stwRentabilitäten_US
dc.subject.stwLohnverhandlungenen_US
dc.subject.stwVerhandlungstheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwGerechtigkeiten_US
dc.subject.stwEmotionen_US
dc.subject.stwTesten_US
dc.titleEffects of profitable downsizing on collective bargainingen_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn559800916en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

Files in This Item:
File
Size
500.18 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.