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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2007
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Jena Economic Research Papers No. 2007,104
Verlag: 
Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics, Jena
Zusammenfassung: 
In a two-person ¯nitely repeated public goods experiment, we use intentions data to interpret individual behavior. Based on a random-utility model speci¯cation, we develop a relationship between a player's beliefs about others' behavior and his contributions' plans, and use this relationship to identify the player's most likely preference \type. Our estimation analysis indicates that players are heterogeneous in their preferences also at the intentional level. Moreover, our data show that deviations from intended actions are positively related to changes in beliefs, thereby suggesting that people are able to plan.
Schlagwörter: 
Public goods games
Experiments
Latent-class logit
Conditional cooperation
JEL: 
C70
C72
C92
H41
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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