Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/256814 
Year of Publication: 
2021
Series/Report no.: 
NBB Working Paper No. 403
Publisher: 
National Bank of Belgium, Brussels
Abstract: 
This discussion paper investigates the differences existing between the Single Point of Entry and the Multiple Point of Entry resolution models and links this question to the issue of support that bank subsidiaries can expect from their parent companies both in resolution and in normal insolvency proceedings. Given that parental support remains imperfect in these two resolution models, the paper concludes that existing safeguards aiming at preserving the corporate interests of subsidiaries remain needed and justified. The paper then identifies potential avenues that could be further explored to reinforce the support model and thereby reduce incentives to adopt ring-fencing measures.
Subjects: 
Bank resolution
SPE
Banking crisis
bail-in
bankruptcy
JEL: 
G10
G21
G28
K22
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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