Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/256794 
Year of Publication: 
2022
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Paper No. 327
Publisher: 
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München und Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190 - Rationality and Competition, München und Berlin
Abstract: 
We analyze novel portfolio liquidation games with self-exciting order flow. Both the N-player game and the mean-field game are considered. We assume that players' trading activities have an impact on the dynamics of future market order arrivals thereby generating an additional transient price impact. Given the strategies of her competitors each player solves a mean-field control problem. We characterize open-loop Nash equilibria in both games in terms of a novel mean-field FBSDE system with unknown terminal condition. Under a weak interaction condition we prove that the FBSDE systems have unique solutions. Using a novel sufficient maximum principle that does not require convexity of the cost function we finally prove that the solution of the FBSDE systems do indeed provide open-loop Nash equilibria.
Subjects: 
stochastic games
mean-field games
portfolio liquidation
Hawkes process
singular terminal value
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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