Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/256770 
Year of Publication: 
2022
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Paper No. 303
Publisher: 
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München und Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190 - Rationality and Competition, München und Berlin
Abstract: 
In school choice problems, the widely used manipulable Immediate Acceptance mechanism (IA) disadvantages unsophisticated applicants, but may ex-ante Pareto dominate any strategy-proof alternative. In these cases, it may be preferable to aid applicants within IA, rather than to abandon it. In a laboratory experiment, we first document a substantial gap in strategy choices and outcomes between subjects of higher and lower cognitive ability under IA. We then test whether disclosing information on past applications levels the playing field. The treatment is effective in partially reducing the gap between applicants of above- and below-median cognitive ability and in curbing ability segregation across schools, but may leave the least able applicants further behind.
Subjects: 
laboratory experiment
school choice
immediate acceptance
strategy-proofness
cognitive ability
mechanism design
JEL: 
C78
C91
D82
I24
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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