Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/25675 
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dc.contributor.authorMatthey, Astriden
dc.date.accessioned2008-03-07-
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-27T09:40:01Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-27T09:40:01Z-
dc.date.issued2007-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/25675-
dc.description.abstractPrivate banks often blame state guarantees to distort competition by giving public banks the advantage of lower funding costs. In this paper I show that if borrowers perceive the public bank as supporting economic development, private banks may be able to separate firms by self selection, enter the market, and obtain profits in equilibrium despite their cost disadvantage. The public bank’s competitive advantage may be offset, independently of what its true objective function is. Even perfect competition between private banks does not lead to zero profits.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aFriedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics |cJenaen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aJena Economic Research Papers |x2007,100en
dc.subject.jelG21en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordpublic banksen
dc.subject.keywordstate guaranteeen
dc.subject.keywordself-selectionen
dc.subject.stwÖffentliche Banken
dc.subject.stwStaatshaftungen
dc.subject.stwWettbewerben
dc.subject.stwBanken
dc.subject.stwKreditgeschäften
dc.subject.stwAgency Theoryen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleDo public banks have a competitive advantage?-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn559548591en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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