Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/25661 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2007
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Jena Economic Research Papers No. 2007,081
Verlag: 
Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics, Jena
Zusammenfassung: 
Our objective in this paper is to assess the acceptability of the ambient tax. Concretely, we ask subjects to choose between (A) an ambient tax and (B) an individual tax system. In case (A), they actually participate in a game in which their payo depends on all participants' decisions and on natural variability as would be the case in the real world if an ambient tax was implemented. In case (B) they simply earn a sure payo ; which is supposed to re ect their maximal pro t under the individual tax system. We take the percentage of agents preferring the ambient tax to a given sure payo level as an indicator of the acceptability of the ambient tax given this sure payo level. Our experimental results mitigate the common belief that am- bient taxes are totally unacceptable. If the sure alternative to the ambient tax policy is very costly for the polluters, for example because it involves high inspection costs, polluters might eventually prefer being liable to an ambient tax.
Schlagwörter: 
Nonpoint Source Pollution
Group Decision Making
Experiments
Acceptability of scal instruments
JEL: 
C92
H3
Q5
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
574.59 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.