Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/25660
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dc.contributor.authorRai, Birendra K.en_US
dc.contributor.authorSarin, Rajiven_US
dc.date.accessioned2007-12-14en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-27T09:39:50Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-27T09:39:50Z-
dc.date.issued2007en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/25660-
dc.description.abstractThe key element of models of contest is the Contest Success Function (CSF) which specifies the winning probabilities of agents. The existing axiomatizations of CSFs assume that contestants can make only one type of investment. This paper generalizes these axiomatizations to the case where each agent can have multiple types of investments. This allows us to provide a unified framework to extend and interpret the results of Skaperdas (1996) and Clark and Riis (1998), and rationalize some seemingly ad hoc CSFs used by applied researchers.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aUniversität Jena und Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik|cJenaen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aJena economic research papers|x2007,082en_US
dc.subject.jelC70en_US
dc.subject.jelD72en_US
dc.subject.jelD74en_US
dc.subject.keywordContesten_US
dc.subject.keywordRent Seekingen_US
dc.subject.stwSpieltheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwRent Seekingen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleGeneralized contest success functionsen_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn553838784en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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