Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/25660 
Full metadata record
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorRai, Birendra K.en
dc.contributor.authorSarin, Rajiven
dc.date.accessioned2007-12-14-
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-27T09:39:50Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-27T09:39:50Z-
dc.date.issued2007-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/25660-
dc.description.abstractThe key element of models of contest is the Contest Success Function (CSF) which specifies the winning probabilities of agents. The existing axiomatizations of CSFs assume that contestants can make only one type of investment. This paper generalizes these axiomatizations to the case where each agent can have multiple types of investments. This allows us to provide a unified framework to extend and interpret the results of Skaperdas (1996) and Clark and Riis (1998), and rationalize some seemingly ad hoc CSFs used by applied researchers.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aFriedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics |cJenaen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aJena Economic Research Papers |x2007,082en
dc.subject.jelC70en
dc.subject.jelD72en
dc.subject.jelD74en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordContesten
dc.subject.keywordRent Seekingen
dc.subject.stwSpieltheorieen
dc.subject.stwRent Seekingen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleGeneralized contest success functions-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn553838784en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

Files in This Item:
File
Size
371.84 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.