Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/25649
Authors: 
Güth, Werner
Levati, Maria Vittoria
Weiland, Torsten
Year of Publication: 
2007
Series/Report no.: 
Jena economic research papers 2007,048
Abstract: 
In a public goods experiment, subjects can vary over a period of stochastic length two contribution levels: one is publicly observable (their cheap talk stated intention), while the other is not seen by the others (their secret intention). When the period suddenly stops, participants are restricted to choose as actual contribution either current alternative. Based on the two types of choice data for a partners and a perfect strangers condition, we confirm that final outcomes strongly depend on the matching protocol. As to choice dynamics, we distinguish different types of adaptations.
Subjects: 
Public goods game
Cheap talk communication
Real-time protocol
JEL: 
C72
H41
D82
D83
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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