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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2007
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Jena Economic Research Papers No. 2007,002
Verlag: 
Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics, Jena
Zusammenfassung: 
Central bank independence (CBI) is a very important precondition for price stability. However, the empirical evidence for a correlation between both is relatively weak. In this paper, this weakness is countered with a) an extended measure of monetary commitment, which includes well-known criteria for CBI and external criteria such as convertibility and exchange rate regimes and b) the argument that monetary commitment can grant price stability best if it is backed by an adequate assignment of economic policy. An empirical assessment with data from four decades confirms the crucial role of monetary commitment for price stability.
Schlagwörter: 
central bank independence
price stability
monetary commitment
JEL: 
E50
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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