Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/25473 
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dc.contributor.authorMuermann, Alexanderen
dc.contributor.authorShore, Stephen H.en
dc.date.accessioned2006-08-07-
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-24T13:47:51Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-24T13:47:51Z-
dc.date.issued2006-
dc.identifier.piurn:nbn:de:hebis:30-25980en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/25473-
dc.description.abstractWhen a spot market monopolist has a position in a corresponding futures market, he has an incentive to deviate from the spot market optimum to make this position more profitable. Rational futures market makers take this into account when setting prices. We show that the monopolist, by randomizing his futures market position, can strategically exploit his market power at the expense of other futures market participants. Furthermore, traders without market power can manipulate futures prices by hiding their orders behind the monopolist's strategic trades. The moral hazard problem stemming from spot market power thus provides a venue for strategic trading and manipulation that parallels the adverse selection problem stemming from inside information.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aGoethe University Frankfurt, Center for Financial Studies (CFS) |cFrankfurt a. M.en
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCFS Working Paper |x2006/07en
dc.subject.jelD82en
dc.subject.jelG13en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordStrategic Tradingen
dc.subject.keywordManipulationen
dc.subject.keywordSpot Market Poweren
dc.titleStrategic trading and manipulation with spot market power-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn515334006en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:cfswop:200607en

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