Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/25461 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2005
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CFS Working Paper No. 2005/24
Verlag: 
Goethe University Frankfurt, Center for Financial Studies (CFS), Frankfurt a. M.
Zusammenfassung: 
How do markets spread risk when events are unknown or unknowable and where not anticipated in an insurance contract? While the policyholder can 'hold up' the insurer for extra contractual payments, the continuing gains from trade on a single contract are often too small to yield useful coverage. By acting as a repository of the reputations of the parties, we show the brokers provide a coordinating mechanism to leverage the collective hold up power of policyholders. This extends both the degree of implicit and explicit coverage. The role is reflected in the terms of broker engagement, specifically in the ownership by the broker of the renewal rights. Finally, we argue that brokers can be motivated to play this role when they receive commissions that are contingent on insurer profits. This last feature questions a recent, well publicized, attack on broker compensation by New York attorney general, Elliot Spitzer.
Schlagwörter: 
Incomplete Insurance Contracts
Brokerage
Contingent Commissions
Reputation
JEL: 
G22
G24
L14
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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