Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/25441 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2004
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CFS Working Paper No. 2004/18
Verlag: 
Goethe University Frankfurt, Center for Financial Studies (CFS), Frankfurt a. M.
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper analyzes banks' choice between lending to firms individually and sharing lending with other banks, when firms and banks are subject to moral hazard and monitoring is essential. Multiple-bank lending is optimal whenever the benefit of greater diversification in terms of higher monitoring dominates the costs of free-riding and duplication of efforts. The model predicts a greater use of multiple-bank lending when banks are small relative to investment projects, firms are less profitable, and poor financial integration, regulation and inefficient judicial systems increase monitoring costs. These results are consistent with empirical observations concerning small business lending and loan syndication.
Schlagwörter: 
individual-bank lending
multiple-bank lending
monitoring
diversification
free-riding problem
JEL: 
D82
G21
G32
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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