Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/25384
Authors: 
Bascha, Andreas
Walz, Uwe
Year of Publication: 
2002
Series/Report no.: 
CFS Working Paper 2002/08
Abstract: 
This paper investigates the financial contracting behavior of German venture capitalists against the results of recent theoretical work on the design of venture capital contracts, especially with regard to the use of convertible securities. First, we identify a special feature of the German market, namely that public-private partnership agencies require significantly lower returns than private and young venture capitalists. The latter are most likely to follow their North-American counterpart by refinancing themselves with closed-end funds. Second, with regard to financing practices it is shown that the use of convertibles, relative to other instruments, is influenced by the anticipated severity of agency problems.
Subjects: 
Venture Capital
Convertible Securities
Agency Theory
JEL: 
C24
G24
G32
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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