Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/253656 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2016
Verlag: 
ZBW – Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, Kiel, Hamburg
Zusammenfassung: 
We show how a brand manufacturer's control over retail prices can lead to efficiencies when consumers rely on prices as a signal of quality. For this we first show how higher prices can be associated with both higher quality perception as well as higher actual quality. We next identify a conflict of interest between retailers and manufactures. Retailers do not internalize the ensuing reputation spill-over that higher prices have on demand at all outlets. And they have less incentives to support brand image through higher prices as this erodes their own position in negotiations while increasing that of the manufacturer. Our efficiency defence for RPM thus applies even when retailers need not be incentivized to undertake non-contractible activities, as in our model the key opportunism problem, with respect to quality provision, lies between the manufacturer and consumers.
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
290.57 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.