Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/253534 
Year of Publication: 
2022
Citation: 
[Journal:] Theoretical Economics [ISSN:] 1555-7561 [Volume:] 17 [Issue:] 1 [Publisher:] The Econometric Society [Place:] New Haven, CT [Year:] 2022 [Pages:] 219-251
Publisher: 
The Econometric Society, New Haven, CT
Abstract: 
We study how changes to the informativeness of signals in Bayesian games and single-agent decision problems affect the distribution of equilibrium actions. Focusing on supermodular environments, we provide conditions under which a more precise private signal for one agent leads to an increasing-mean spread or a decreasing-mean spread of equilibrium actions for all agents. We apply our comparative statics to information disclosure games between a sender and many receivers and derive sufficient conditions on the primitive payoffs that lead to extremal disclosure of information.
Subjects: 
Supermodular stochastic order
convex order
persuasion with many receievers
JEL: 
C44
C61
D42
D81
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc Logo
Document Type: 
Article

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