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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2021
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] Theoretical Economics [ISSN:] 1555-7561 [Volume:] 16 [Issue:] 3 [Publisher:] The Econometric Society [Place:] New Haven, CT [Year:] 2021 [Pages:] 777-797
Verlag: 
The Econometric Society, New Haven, CT
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper introduces two simple betting mechanisms, Top-Flop and Threshold betting, to elicit unverifiable information from crowds. Agents are offered bets on the rating of an item about which they received a private signal versus that of a random item. We characterize conditions for the chosen bet to reveal the agents' private signal even if the underlying ratings are biased. We further provide micro-economic foundations of the ratings, which are endogenously determined by the actions of other agents in a game setting. Our mechanisms relax standard assumptions of the literature, such as common prior, and homogeneous and risk neutral agents.
Schlagwörter: 
Bets
private signals
Bayesian game
elicitation
JEL: 
D8
C9
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