Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/253525 
Authors: 
Year of Publication: 
2021
Citation: 
[Journal:] Theoretical Economics [ISSN:] 1555-7561 [Volume:] 16 [Issue:] 2 [Publisher:] The Econometric Society [Place:] New Haven, CT [Year:] 2021 [Pages:] 449-475
Publisher: 
The Econometric Society, New Haven, CT
Abstract: 
I study a repeated game in which a patient player wants to win the trust of some myopic opponents but can strictly benefit from betraying them. His benefit from betrayal is strictly positive and is his persistent private information. I characterize every type of patient player's highest equilibrium payoff and construct equilibria that attain this payoff. Since the patient player's Stackelberg action is mixed and motivating the lowest-benefit type to play mixed actions is costly, every type's highest equilibrium payoff is strictly lower than his Stackelberg payoff. In every equilibrium where the patient player approximately attains his highest equilibrium payoff, no type of the patient player plays stationary strategies or completely mixed strategies.
Subjects: 
Reputation
no commitment type
equilibrium payoff
equilibrium behavior
JEL: 
C73
D82
D83
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc Logo
Document Type: 
Article

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