Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/253509 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2021
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] Theoretical Economics [ISSN:] 1555-7561 [Volume:] 16 [Issue:] 2 [Publisher:] The Econometric Society [Place:] New Haven, CT [Year:] 2021 [Pages:] 477-506
Verlag: 
The Econometric Society, New Haven, CT
Zusammenfassung: 
We consider a platform which provides probabilistic forecasts to a customer using some algorithm. We introduce a concept of miscalibration, which measures the discrepancy between the forecast and the truth. We characterize the platform's optimal equilibrium when it incurs some cost for miscalibration, and show how this equilibrium depends on the miscalibration cost: when the miscalibration cost is low, the platform uses more distant forecasts and the customer is less responsive to the platform's forecast; when the miscalibration cost is high, the platform can achieve its commitment payoff in an equilibrium, and the only extensive-form rationalizable strategy of the platform is its strategy in the commitment solution. Our results show that miscalibration cost is a proxy for the degree of the platform's commitment power, and thus provide a microfoundation for the commitment solution.
Schlagwörter: 
Calibration
miscalibration
cheap talk
commitment
Bayesian persuasion
e-commerce platform
JEL: 
D81
D82
D83
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Creative-Commons-Lizenz: 
cc-by-nc Logo
Dokumentart: 
Article

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.