Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/253473 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2020
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] Theoretical Economics [ISSN:] 1555-7561 [Volume:] 15 [Issue:] 3 [Publisher:] The Econometric Society [Place:] New Haven, CT [Year:] 2020 [Pages:] 1023-1058
Verlag: 
The Econometric Society, New Haven, CT
Zusammenfassung: 
We consider dynamic team production in the presence of uncertainty. Team members receive interim feedback that depends on both their current effort level and the project's uncertain prospects. In this environment, each member can encourage the others by making them more optimistic about the project's prospects. We study the extent to which this incentive counters the usual free-riding incentive. Restricting the agents' access to feedback can increase their equilibrium effort levels by mitigating the ratchet effect. In this case, using joint performance measures can be beneficial even when individual measures are available.
Schlagwörter: 
Team production
free-riding
uncertainty
learning
JEL: 
C72
C73
D23
D83
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