Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/253471 
Year of Publication: 
2021
Citation: 
[Journal:] Theoretical Economics [ISSN:] 1555-7561 [Volume:] 16 [Issue:] 1 [Publisher:] The Econometric Society [Place:] New Haven, CT [Year:] 2021 [Pages:] 161-196
Publisher: 
The Econometric Society, New Haven, CT
Abstract: 
We study when equilibrium prices can aggregate information in an auction market with a large population of traders. Our main result identifies a property of information---the betweenness property---that is both necessary and sufficient for information aggregation. The characterization provides novel predictions about equilibrium prices in complex, multidimensional environments.
Subjects: 
Auctions
betweenness
competitive markets
information aggregation
rational expectations equilibrium
JEL: 
C72
D44
D82
D83
G14
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc Logo
Document Type: 
Article

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