Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/253456 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2021
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] Theoretical Economics [ISSN:] 1555-7561 [Volume:] 16 [Issue:] 4 [Publisher:] The Econometric Society [Place:] New Haven, CT [Year:] 2021 [Pages:] 1221-1248
Verlag: 
The Econometric Society, New Haven, CT
Zusammenfassung: 
Harris, Reny, and Robson (1995) added a public randomization device to dynamic games with almost perfect information to ensure existence of subgame perfect equilibria (SPE). We show that when Nature's moves are atomless in the original game, public randomization does not enlarge the set of SPE payoffs: any SPE obtained using public randomization can be "decorrelated" to produce a payoff-equivalent SPE of the original game. As a corollary, we provide an alternative route to a result of He and Sun (2020) on existence of SPE without public randomization, which in turn yields equilibrium existence for stochastic games with weakly continuous state transitions.
Schlagwörter: 
Existence
subgame-perfect equilibrium
infinite-action games
stochastic games
public randomization
JEL: 
C72
C73
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