Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/253292 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2022
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Economics Working Paper Series No. 22/370
Verlag: 
ETH Zurich, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research, Zurich
Zusammenfassung: 
Experts often disagree. A decision-maker may be averse to such expert disagreement. Existing models of aversion to expert disagreement rest on ambiguity-averse preferences adopting a unanimity principle: If all experts consider one choice better than another, so should the decision-maker. Such unanimity among experts, however, can be spurious, masking substantial disagreement on the underlying reasons. We introduce a novel notion of disagreement aversion to distinguish spurious from genuine unanimity and develop a model that can capture disagreement aversion in our sense. The central element of our model is the cautious aggregation of experts' beliefs.
Schlagwörter: 
Disagreement Aversion
Ambiguity Aversion
Belief Aggregation
Decision under Uncertainty
Precautionary Principle
JEL: 
D81
D83
D71
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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