Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/25322 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2009
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
SFB 649 Discussion Paper No. 2009,006
Verlag: 
Humboldt University of Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649 - Economic Risk, Berlin
Zusammenfassung: 
The paper provides a tractable, analytical framework to study regulatory risk under optimal incentive regulation. Regulatory risk is captured by uncertainty about the policy variables in the regulator's objective function: weights attached to profits and costs of public funds. Results are as follows: 1) The regulator's reaction to regulatory risk depends on the curvature of the aggregate demand function. 2) It yields a positive information rent effect exactly when demand is convex. 3) Firms benefit from regulatory risk exactly when demand is convex. 4) Consumers' risk preferences tend to contradict the firms. 5) Benevolent regulators always prefer regulatory risk and these preferences may contradict both the firms and consumers' preferences.
Schlagwörter: 
Optimal incentive regulation
regulatory risk
procurement
information rents
JEL: 
L51
D82
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
356.41 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.