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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/25275
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DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Block, Jörn Hendrich | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2008-07-14 | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2009-07-23T15:03:50Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2009-07-23T15:03:50Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2008 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/25275 | - |
dc.description.abstract | The relationship between CEO pay and performance has been much analyzed in the management and economics literature. This study analyzes the structure of executive compensation in family and non-family firms. In line with predictions of agency theory, it is found that the share of base salary is higher with family-member CEOs than it is with nonfamily member CEOs. Furthermore, family-member CEOs receive a lower share of option pay. The paper's findings have implications for family business research and the executive compensation literature. To make the findings robust, the statistical analysis is performed with both Bayesian and classical frequentist methods. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aHumboldt University of Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649 - Economic Risk |cBerlin | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aSFB 649 Discussion Paper |x2008,033 | en |
dc.subject.jel | G30 | en |
dc.subject.jel | J30 | en |
dc.subject.jel | M52 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Executive compensation | en |
dc.subject.keyword | family firms | en |
dc.subject.keyword | stock options | en |
dc.subject.keyword | agency theory | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Bayesian analysis | en |
dc.subject.stw | Führungskräfte | en |
dc.subject.stw | Vergütungssystem | en |
dc.subject.stw | Familienunternehmen | en |
dc.subject.stw | Agency Theory | en |
dc.subject.stw | Aktienoptionsplan | en |
dc.subject.stw | Schätzung | en |
dc.subject.stw | USA | en |
dc.title | Are CEOs in family firms paid like bureaucrats?: evidence from Bayesian and frequentist analyses | - |
dc.type | |aWorking Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 571729436 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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