Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/25263 
Full metadata record
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorBoeri, Titoen
dc.contributor.authorBurda, Michael C.en
dc.date.accessioned2008-02-28-
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-23T15:03:41Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-23T15:03:41Z-
dc.date.issued2008-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/25263-
dc.description.abstractStandard models of equilibrium unemployment assume exogenous labour market institutions and flexible wage determination. This paper models wage rigidity and collective bargaining endogenously, when workers differ by observable skill and may adopt either individualised or collective wage bargaining. In the calibrated model, a substantial fraction of workers and firms as well as the median voter prefer collective bargaining to the decentralised regime. A fundamental distortion of the separation decision represented by employment protection (a firing tax) is necessary for such preferences to emerge. Endogenizing collective bargaining can significantly modify comparative statics effects of policy arising in a single-regime setting.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aHumboldt University of Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649 - Economic Risk |cBerlinen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aSFB 649 Discussion Paper |x2008,021en
dc.subject.jelJ5en
dc.subject.jelJ6en
dc.subject.jelD7en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordWage rigidityen
dc.subject.keywordemployment protectionen
dc.subject.keywordequilibrium unemploymenten
dc.subject.stwTarifpolitiken
dc.subject.stwLohnverhandlungenen
dc.subject.stwPublic Choiceen
dc.subject.stwTheorie der Arbeitslosigkeiten
dc.subject.stwLohnrigiditäten
dc.subject.stwKündigungsschutzen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titlePreferences for collective versus individualised wage setting-
dc.type|aWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn559086466en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.