Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/25227 
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dc.contributor.authorvon Lilienfeld-Toal, Ulfen
dc.contributor.authorRuenzi, Stefanen
dc.date.accessioned2008-02-20-
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-23T15:03:16Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-23T15:03:16Z-
dc.date.issued2007-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/25227-
dc.description.abstractWe examine the relationship between CEO ownership and stock market performance. Firms in which the CEO voluntarily holds a considerable share of outstanding stocks outperform the market by more than 10% p.a. after controlling for traditional risk factors. The effect is most pronounced in firms that are characterized by large managerial discretion of the CEO. The abnormal returns we document are one potential explanation why so many CEOs hold a large fraction of their own company's stocks. We also examine several potential explanations why the existence of an owner CEO is not fully reflected in prices but leads to abnormal returns.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aHumboldt University of Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649 - Economic Risk |cBerlinen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aSFB 649 Discussion Paper |x2007,055en
dc.subject.jelG12en
dc.subject.jelG30en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordCEO-Ownershipen
dc.subject.keywordAsset Pricing with large shareholdersen
dc.subject.stwBörsenkursen
dc.subject.stwUnternehmensentwicklungen
dc.subject.stwFührungskräfteen
dc.subject.stwEigentümerstrukturen
dc.subject.stwWertpapieranalyseen
dc.subject.stwUSAen
dc.titleWhy managers hold shares of their firms: an empirical analysis-
dc.type|aWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn558614817en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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