Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/252143 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2022
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 9626
Verlag: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Zusammenfassung: 
I study whether saving behavior reveals socially relevant intertemporal preferences. To this end, I decompose the present generation's preference for the next into its dynastic and cross-dynastic components in a model of saving. If people are concerned about the next generation as such, then they might assign welfare weights on other dynasties. With such cross-dynastic intergenerational altruism, saving for one's descendants benefits present members of other dynasties. These preference externalities imply that socially relevant intertemporal preferences cannot be inferred from saving behavior. Numerically, I show that even \small" preferences for the next generation as such can lower the efficient discount rate by 20% to 40%, as compared to Nordhaus' calibration.
Schlagwörter: 
intergenerational altruism
social discounting
time-inconsistency
declining discount rates
generalized consumption Euler equations
interdependent utility
isolation paradox
JEL: 
D64
D71
H43
Q01
Q54
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
Erscheint in der Sammlung:

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.