Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/25200 
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dc.contributor.authorGrimm, Oliveren
dc.contributor.authorRied, Stefanen
dc.date.accessioned2008-02-19-
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-23T14:44:47Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-23T14:44:47Z-
dc.date.issued2007-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/25200-
dc.description.abstractWe use a two-country model with a central bank maximizing union-wide welfare and two fiscal authorities minimizing comparable, but slightly different country-wide losses. We analyze the rivalry between the three authorities in seven static games. Comparing a homogeneous with a heterogeneous monetary union, we find welfare losses to be significantly larger in the heterogeneous union. The best-performing scenarios are cooperation between all authorities and monetary leadership. Cooperation between the fiscal authorities is harmful to both the whole union's and the country-specific welfare.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aHumboldt University of Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649 - Economic Risk |cBerlinen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aSFB 649 Discussion Paper |x2007,028en
dc.subject.jelE52en
dc.subject.jelE61en
dc.subject.jelF42en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordmonetary unionen
dc.subject.keywordheterogeneitiesen
dc.subject.keywordpolicy gameen
dc.subject.keywordsimultaneous policyen
dc.subject.keywordsequential policyen
dc.subject.keywordcoordinationen
dc.subject.keyworddiscretionary policiesen
dc.subject.stwWährungsunionen
dc.subject.stwFinanzpolitiken
dc.subject.stwInternationale wirtschaftspolitische Koordinationen
dc.subject.stwGeldpolitiken
dc.subject.stwWohlfahrtseffekten
dc.subject.stwSpieltheorieen
dc.titleMacroeconomic policy in a heterogeneous Monetary Union-
dc.type|aWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn558548563en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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