Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/251741 
Year of Publication: 
2022
Series/Report no.: 
Economics Working Paper Series No. 22/367
Publisher: 
ETH Zurich, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research, Zurich
Abstract: 
A monopolist data intermediary collects consumer information that it strategically sells to competing firms in a product market for price discrimination purposes. The intermediary charges a price of information and chooses the optimal partition that maximizes the willingness to pay of firms for information. Different selling mechanisms are compared: list prices, sequential bargaining, and auctions. The intermediary optimally sells information through auctions, whereas consumer surplus is maximized with sequential bargaining and list prices. We discuss the regulatory implications of our results.
Subjects: 
Selling mechanisms
Market for information
Data intermediaries
Competition policy
Regulation of digital markets
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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