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dc.contributor.authorDemougin, Dominique M.en
dc.contributor.authorFabel, Oliveren
dc.date.accessioned2006-10-05-
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-23T14:43:57Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-23T14:43:57Z-
dc.date.issued2006-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/25129-
dc.description.abstractThe current study investigates a tripartite incentive contract between an innovator supplying an intellectual asset, a professional assigned to productive tasks, and a consulting firm specializing in matching ideas and professional skills. A rather simple pure tripartite partnership implements the consultant's expected profit maximum and maximizes the project's expected surplus. The liquidity-constrained professional is compensated by receiving a share of one half in the new venture. The consultant's and the innovator's shares reflect the relative value of search. However, the consultant's optimal search effort to find an appropriate production partner is inefficiently low.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aHumboldt University of Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649 - Economic Risk |cBerlinen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aSFB 649 Discussion Paper |x2006,047en
dc.subject.jelM13en
dc.subject.jelM21en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordnew venturesen
dc.subject.keywordtripartite incentive contracten
dc.subject.keywordconsulting contracten
dc.subject.keywordpartnershipsen
dc.subject.stwTheorie der Unternehmungen
dc.subject.stwAnreizvertragen
dc.subject.stwUnternehmensgründungen
dc.titleThe division of ownership in new ventures-
dc.type|aWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn518430960en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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