Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/251220 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2022
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2015: Ökonomische Entwicklung - Theorie und Politik - Session: Tax experiments No. E15-V1
Versionsangabe: 
Revised: March 2022
Verlag: 
ZBW – Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
Zusammenfassung: 
Many countries grant exemption from legal prosecution under certain conditions, allowing for voluntary disclosures regarding tax evasion. Empirically, tax amnesties appear most successful when accompanied by an increase in enforcement efforts because they help evaders to adjust to the new circumstances. Time-limited amnesties are often repeated or in some countries even permanent. Anticipated tax amnesties can, however, serve as an insurance against a rise in the detection probability, potentially leading to less and not more tax compliance. We test the relevance of this insurance effect in an experimental tax game and disentangle it from an effect on tax morale, i.e., non-pecuniary motives to comply. We ftnd that the former effect indeed decreases overall tax compliance by about 7-10 percent, showing its relevance for the design of tax policies. A high predictability of amnesties may work to their detriment.
Schlagwörter: 
tax compliance
tax amnesty
lab experiment
social norms
JEL: 
H24
H26
C91
Dokumentart: 
Conference Paper

Datei(en):
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