Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/25110 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2006
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
SFB 649 Discussion Paper No. 2006,027
Verlag: 
Humboldt University of Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649 - Economic Risk, Berlin
Zusammenfassung: 
We compare the effect of legal and institutional competition for the design of labor institutions in an environment characterized by holdup problems in human and physical capital. We compare autarky with the two country case, assuming that capital is perfectly mobile and labor immobile. We distinguish two cases. In the first, the political system is free from capture, while in the second, we examine the case where labor captures the institutional design problem. We find that in the former case, a competition of systems reduces welfare while in the latter it improves the overall outcome.
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
490.28 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.