Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/25073 
Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-FeldWertSprache
dc.contributor.authorScholl, Almuthen
dc.date.accessioned2006-05-29-
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-23T14:43:17Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-23T14:43:17Z-
dc.date.issued2005-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/25073-
dc.description.abstractThis paper analyzes optimal foreign aid policy in a neoclassical framework with a conflict of interest between the donor and the recipient government. Aid conditionality is modelled as a limited enforceable contract. We define conditional aid policy to be self-enforcing if, at any point in time, the conditions imposed on aid funds are supportable by the threat of a permanent aid cutoff from then onward. Quantitative results show that the effectiveness of unconditional aid is low while self-enforcing conditional aid strongly stimulates the economy. However, increasing the welfare of the poor comes at high cost: to ensure aid effectiveness, less democratic political regimes receive permanently larger aid funds.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aHumboldt University of Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649 - Economic Risk |cBerlinen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aSFB 649 Discussion Paper |x2005,054en
dc.subject.jelE13en
dc.subject.jelF35en
dc.subject.jelO11en
dc.subject.jelO19en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.titleAid effectiveness and limited enforceable conditionality-
dc.type|aWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn512452091en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
635.08 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.