Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/25073
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dc.contributor.authorScholl, Almuthen_US
dc.date.accessioned2006-05-29en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-23T14:43:17Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-23T14:43:17Z-
dc.date.issued2005en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/25073-
dc.description.abstractThis paper analyzes optimal foreign aid policy in a neoclassical framework with a conflict of interest between the donor and the recipient government. Aid conditionality is modelled as a limited enforceable contract. We define conditional aid policy to be self-enforcing if, at any point in time, the conditions imposed on aid funds are supportable by the threat of a permanent aid cutoff from then onward. Quantitative results show that the effectiveness of unconditional aid is low while self-enforcing conditional aid strongly stimulates the economy. However, increasing the welfare of the poor comes at high cost: to ensure aid effectiveness, less democratic political regimes receive permanently larger aid funds.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aSFB 649, Economic Risk|cBerlinen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aSFB 649 discussion paper|x2005,054en_US
dc.subject.jelE13en_US
dc.subject.jelF35en_US
dc.subject.jelO11en_US
dc.subject.jelO19en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.titleAid effectiveness and limited enforceable conditionalityen_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn512452091en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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