Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/25071 
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dc.contributor.authorSchöttner, Anjaen
dc.date.accessioned2006-05-29-
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-23T14:43:15Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-23T14:43:15Z-
dc.date.issued2005-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/25071-
dc.description.abstractThis paper analyzes the problem of optimal job design when there is only one contractible and imperfect performance measure for all tasks whose contribution to firm value is non-verifiable. I find that task splitting is optimal when relational contracts based on firm value are not feasible. By contrast, if an agent who performs a given set of tasks receives an implicit bonus, the principal always benefits from assigning an additional task to this agent.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aHumboldt University of Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649 - Economic Risk |cBerlinen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aSFB 649 Discussion Paper |x2005,052en
dc.subject.jelM51en
dc.subject.jelM54en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordjob designen
dc.subject.keywordmulti-taskingen
dc.subject.keywordrelational contractsen
dc.titleRelational contracts and job design-
dc.type|aWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn512449732en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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