Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/25071
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dc.contributor.authorSchöttner, Anjaen_US
dc.date.accessioned2006-05-29en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-23T14:43:15Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-23T14:43:15Z-
dc.date.issued2005en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/25071-
dc.description.abstractThis paper analyzes the problem of optimal job design when there is only one contractible and imperfect performance measure for all tasks whose contribution to firm value is non-verifiable. I find that task splitting is optimal when relational contracts based on firm value are not feasible. By contrast, if an agent who performs a given set of tasks receives an implicit bonus, the principal always benefits from assigning an additional task to this agent.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aSFB 649, Economic Risk|cBerlinen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aSFB 649 discussion paper|x2005,052en_US
dc.subject.jelM51en_US
dc.subject.jelM54en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordjob designen_US
dc.subject.keywordmulti-taskingen_US
dc.subject.keywordrelational contractsen_US
dc.titleRelational contracts and job designen_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn512449732en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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