Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/250538 
Year of Publication: 
2021
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 14877
Publisher: 
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), Bonn
Abstract: 
This paper examines the effects of reforms that reduced alimony on matching in the marriage market. Recent literature indicates that divorce law changes which reduce commitment or income-sharing upon separation will lead to an increase in assortative matching, as women forgo specialization which may not be compensated upon divorce. Using state-level data on alimony reform that reduced the entitlements of eligible spouses and American Community Survey data on marriage and the characteristics of newlyweds, we find that alimony reform increased measures of spousal covariance in education. Our results indicate that correlation coefficients on spousal degree attainment consistently rise with alimony reform, and regression-based measures of assortative matching increase similarly. Moreover, we find the largest effects among those groups who might be more sensitive to the reform. Regression-based measures of assortative matching increase by over 10% among couples in which at least one partner had previously been married and by 9% among those couples who marry in states with less generous property division and child support which are often treated as substitutes for alimony in divorce settlements.
Subjects: 
marriage
matching
divorce law
alimony
assortative matching
commitment mechanisms
JEL: 
J12
K12
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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