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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/25050
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DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Schöttner, Anja | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2005-10-26 | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2009-07-23T14:43:01Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2009-07-23T14:43:01Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2005 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/25050 | - |
dc.description.abstract | This paper analyzes a procurement setting with two identical firms and stochastic innovations. In contrast to the previous literature, I show that a procurer who cannot charge entry fees may prefer a fixed-prize tournament to a first-price auction since holding an auction may leave higher rents to firms when the innovation technology is subject to large random factors. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aHumboldt University of Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649 - Economic Risk |cBerlin | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aSFB 649 Discussion Paper |x2005,041 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D44 | en |
dc.subject.jel | H57 | en |
dc.subject.jel | L15 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | innovation contest | en |
dc.subject.keyword | auction | en |
dc.subject.keyword | tournament | en |
dc.subject.keyword | quality | en |
dc.title | Fixed-prize tournaments versus first-price auctions in innovation contests | - |
dc.type | |aWorking Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 501723919 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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